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Abstract
Adversarial attacks against neural networks in a regression set-
ting are a critical yet understudied problem. In this work, we
advance the state of the art by investigating adversarial attacks
against regression networks and by formulating a more effec-
tive defense against these attacks. In particular, we take the
perspective that adversarial attacks are likely caused by numer-
ical instability in learned functions. We introduce a stability
inducing, regularization based defense against adversarial at-
tacks in the regression setting. Our new and easy to implement
defense is shown to outperform prior approaches and to im-
prove the numerical stability of learned functions.
1 Introduction
Adversarial machine learning has been a research area for
over a decade (Biggio and Roli 2017), but has received in-
creased attention in the past few years. In the adversarial
classification case, some malicious adversary may attempt
to trick or fool a classifier into producing an incorrect deci-
sion. This has natural applications and importance to domains
with real-world adversaries such as spam detection (Lowd
and Meek 2005) and malware (Fleshman et al. 2018), and
the potential to interfere with autonomous systems such as
self-driving cars (Eykholt et al. 2018).
Despite this newfound investment in adversarial machine
learning, we have found that relatively few works investi-
gate the regression case. Regression is a common goal and
component of many systems, and so in this work we seek to
better understand the adversarial problem from the regression
perspective and provide an improved defense technique.
Given a labeled data set {xi, yi}N of N values, the goal is
to predict a real-valued output yi given the feature vector xi ∈
RD. Given a neural network parameterized by θ, the output of
the network becomes yˆi = fθ(xi). To train a network, a loss
`(·) is minimized. The L2 or squared error loss, `(y − yˆ) =
(y − yˆ)2, is a common choice.
Our goal in this work is to better understand how to defend
a neural network model fθ(·) against adversarial perturba-
tions, catalog the differences between adversarial regression
and classification, and develop improved defenses. In par-
ticular, we find that approaching the problem from the per-
spective of numerical stability is informative and allows us
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to devise a new defense that outperforms prior approaches in
this space.
The numerical (in-)stability of an algorithm broadly de-
scribes the degree to which a function’s output may change
with changes in the input. This is a common concern when
implementing numerical libraries and even when implement-
ing neural networks1. We propose the perspective that the
learned network fθ(·) itself is converging to a numerically
unstable solution, which then allows one to readily find ad-
versarial examples.
We propose a regularization based defense by devising a
penalty that encourages stability in learned functions. The
related work to our own will be discussed in section 2, and
the derivation of our technique in section 3. Our methodology
for evaluation will be reviewed in section 4 and results in
section 5, followed by our conclusions in section 6.
2 Related Work
Biggio and Roli (2017) provided an extensive survey of the
history of adversarial machine learning and current research
directions. Even with the recent surge in interest, surprisingly
little work has been done on adversarial regression problems.
Tong et al. (2018) looked at attacks in the special case of an
ensemble of linear models. While informative and able to
make stronger provable statements, the linear case doesn’t
capture the larger class of non-linear problems we are inter-
ested in. The focus on only special cases of regression is a
common theme. For example, others have looked at impor-
tant special case problems like selecting an optimal threshold
against an adversary for regression tasks (Ghafouri, Vorob-
eychik, and Koutsoukos 2018). In contrast, our goal is to
produce a defense that is generically useful to reduce the
effectiveness of adversarial attacks.
As we take a numerical stability perspective to adversar-
ial machine learning, we find that little work has taken the
same approach directly — but many have looked at solutions
from related views. Singh, Sinha, and Krishnamurthy (2018)
in particular look at the hypothesis that the weights of indi-
vidual layers of a network are ill-conditioned. Their work
showed only minor improvement in robustness when penaliz-
ing the condition number κ of the hidden layers. In contrast
1The log-sum-exp trick is a common method of computing the
softmax loss while avoiding numerical instability.
to our work, we are not concerned with the numerical stabil-
ity of individual layers, but with the numerical stability of
the network as a whole function.
In the classification context, it is desirable that the loss
function `(·) should have no change in output for small pertur-
bations ∆ (i.e., the predicted class should remain unchanged).
Lyu, Huang, and Liang (2015) phrased this goal as the min-
max optimization problem in Equation 1.
min
θ
max
∆:‖∆‖p<
`(fθ(x+ ∆)) (1)
This approach makes intuitive sense as a goal to optimize.
The maximization portion finds the perturbation ∆ that max-
imizes the loss, and the outer minimization attempts to mit-
igate this loss by optimizing the parameters θ. Lyu, Huang,
and Liang (2015) and others (Simon-Gabriel et al. 2018; Yu et
al. 2018) have attempted to optimize this objective by approx-
imation via a truncated Taylor series, giving regularizers of
the general form shown in Equation 2, where p∗ = p/(p− 1)
is the dual of p.
 ·
∥∥∥∥∂f(x)∂x
∥∥∥∥
p∗
(2)
This form is equivalent to the absolute condition number
with respect to the p∗ norm. In this new perspective we can
argue these prior works are directly attempting to optimize
the solution with respect to a common notion of numerical
stability. However, these works have been designed for the
classification scenario – where we desire no change in re-
sponse for a small change in input. For regression problems,
we must expect some change in response for any change in
the input. As such, our approach better captures this belief
for the regression case. Our approach will also avoid any use
of the Hessian, avoiding the need for more sophisticated tech-
niques like double-backpropagation (Drucker and Le Cun
1991) in order to compute our regularization term.
In a different vein, more advanced optimization techniques
have been explored to provide provably robust defenses
against adversarial attacks. A number of works have recently
shown this is possible and developed defenses (Abbasi and
Vision 2018; Dvijotham et al. 2018; Wong and Kolter 2018;
Wong, Schmidt, et al. 2018). While these defenses still have
improvements to be made in terms of scalability and fully
capturing potential threat models, they are a promising av-
enue for resolving the adversarial attack issue with regard to
classifiers. However, these solutions rely on the property that
a classifier’s predictions should have zero change under small
perturbations. In regression tasks, the output must necessarily
change with input perturbations, and as such it is not obvious
to us on how to adapt these new approaches to the regression
space.
3 Adversarial Numerical Stability
Regularization
We take the perspective that adversarial attacks are potentially
a symptom of numerical instability in the found solution.
For a numerically stable function f(·), we would expect
that |f(x) − f(x + ∆)| ≤ , where ∆ is a small offset to
x and  some threshold. Most works on adversarial attacks
have looked at making small perturbations to the input that
cause dramatic changes in the output, violating the numerical
stability expectation.
As such, we seek to increase numerical stability by regu-
larizing the network to encourage numerical stability. More
explicitly, we seek to encode the idea that the output of two
points that are near each other should be similar. We start
by defining an adversarial robust loss as (3). Here we use
||∆x||p <  to denote that we are sampling a point ∆x uni-
formly from the p norm ball of radius .
`(y−fθ(x))+λ· E
∆x:||∆x||p<
[` (fθ(x)− fθ(x+ ∆x))] (3)
The goal is that the loss is composed of two components:
the original loss ` applied to the difference between the target
output yi and the predicted output yˆi = fθ(xi), and the
regularization penalty. Our regularization term desires that
the expectation of the output between a point x and all points
within an Lp ball with radius  around x are the same.
Intrinsically, if the output of the neural network is a con-
stant this regularization term will have no penalty and no
adversarial attack is possible with respect to the Lp ball. But
a constant function is not useful, and so the regular loss term
encourages differentiation. The goal is that balancing these
penalties will encourage the response of the network fθ(·) to
have only the degree of variation needed. Rephrased another
way, this penalty imposes a prior belief that the response yˆ of
the network should be smooth and flat — and corresponds
well with our intuition that adversarial attacks are related to
numerical instability. The value λ ∈ R≥0 then controls how
strong this regularization penalty is.
We note that compared to prior works which regulate the
gradient, our use of the expectation over the Lp ball may
seem as a weaker prior. The Gradient Regularization penalties
are derived as approximations to a penalty with respect to
the perturbation that would produce the maximal magnitude
response (i.e., the most numerically unstable point). Our
expectation term must cover all of the Lp ball, and may
not adequately cover the region in which the adversarial
examples exist, but could provide better coverage than the
approximation of the maximal point. The benefit of using our
expectation though is that we now directly tackle our causal
hypothesis, numerical stability, with a penalty that is easy to
implement via sampling.
3.1 Incorporating Local Flexibility
While we have defined the general form of our regularizer
in (3), we note a potential shortcoming in the indiscriminate
application of the λ term. Since we are performing a regres-
sion based problem, we know that some minimal degree of
change in output is expected for any perturbation ∆. Regard-
less of the value of λ, we will end up imposing a penalty on
even small reasonable changes in the output of f(x).
Prior works that used Gradient Regularization share this
same shortcoming. As discussed in section 2, they can be seen
as penalizing the absolute condition number of the learned
function. But if the learned function fθ(·) has a condition
number lower than the true function f∗(·), than our regular-
ization is over-zealous and forcing under-fitting of the model.
If we had the idealized ground-truth function f∗(·), it
would make sense that we should impose no penalty when
|fθ(x)−fθ(x+∆)| ≤ |f∗(x)−f∗(x+∆)|. Ideally the values
should be equal, and when our approximation is smaller it
means it has not yet fully modeled the underlying function
f∗(·). In this case the model needs to increase its complexity,
and so we do not wish to penalize it.
Since we do not have f∗(·), we seek to approximate the
threshold by looking to our training data. If xi is the training
datum under consideration, let x(1)i denote it’s nearest neigh-
bor in the training data (i.e., x(1)i = argminj,∀j 6=i ‖xj−xi‖p).
The idea is that we will assume the label for xi and its near-
est neighbor x(1)i are both reasonably accurate, and thus can
serve as an estimate of the threshold for which no penalty
should occur.∣∣∣f∗(xi)− f∗(x(1)i )∣∣∣ ≈ ∣∣∣yi − y(1)i ∣∣∣ (4)
Since we are using the nearest neighbors to define a thresh-
old for which no changes should occur, we must also factor
in the density of points in each region. A large radius in high
density areas would under-regularize the model if the radius
extended out past some β · ‖xi − x(1)i ‖p where β ∈ R>0
scales the radius.
To deal with this, we will allow each data point xi to have a
different radius ∆xi < i that is based on its nearest neighbor.
For convenience we will denote ∆yi = fθ(x)− fθ(x+ ∆x),
and our regularization term will be given a shorthand Ω, as
defined in Equation 5.
E
∆x:||∆x||p<β·‖xi−x(1)i ‖p
[
`
(
∆yi · 1
[
|∆yi | >
∣∣∣yi − y(1)i ∣∣∣])]
(5)
The value of Ω is now adaptive to the local density of
the input space by the nearest neighbor defined radius, and
imposes no penalty when the perturbed difference |∆yi | is
smaller than the difference in response between a point xi
and its nearest neighbor. This captures our intuition that some
minimal amount of variation in response is to be expected,
and we only wish to penalize unreasonably large deviations.
The final robust loss we would minimize is then `R(y, x) =
`(y − fθ(x)) + λ · Ω.
3.2 An Optimization Connection
We have now walked through our process of deriving the
Adversarial Numerical Stability Regularization (ANSR) term
in Equation 5. Given our derivation, we take a moment to
address some insights and intuition into its nature from an
optimization perspective.
The primary goal of our ANSR term is to incorporate
a prior belief that some minimum degree of flexibility is
necessary for the model to accurately learn the underlying
function, and should only be penalized for response changes
that are larger than necessary.
A way of phrasing this belief from an optimization perspec-
tive is that we want our learned function fθ to be Lipschitz
continuous with respect to some constant K. This would
mean for any input x and perturbation ∆, it would hold that
|fθ(x)−fθ(x+∆)| < K ·‖x−(x+∆)‖p = K ·‖∆‖p. The
Lipschitz property directly captures that the change in outputs
should be no more than a factor of K times the change in in-
puts. It immediately follows that if a fθ is K-Lipschitz, then
an adversarial attack’s success is bounded by ≤ K · ‖∆‖p.
This property is normally desired in order to make stronger
statements about the convergence rate of an optimization pro-
cedure or to better select a step-size during gradient decent.
Instead we are using Lipschitz continuity as a goal for the
function learned, rather than an assumption of the function
being optimized.
In greater detail, our goal is really that fθ be locally Lip-
schitz continuous, such that ∀x ∈ Rd there exists an associ-
ated Kx such that |fθ(x)− fθ(x+ ∆)| < Kx · ‖∆‖p. This
is necessary because the true rate of change for the underly-
ing function will vary throughout the function space. Thus
the global Lipschitz constraint would only protect the area
of the function that has the maximal rate of change, and fail
to bound the safety of flatter and smoother regions of the
function space. Equation 4 serves the same purpose as Kx
(a local measure of the amount of allowed change), and the
β‖xi − x(1)i ‖p term in the expectation estimates the neigh-
borhood and magnitude of ∆. Locally Lipschitz is normally
a weaker assumption (globally Lipschitz implies locally Lips-
chitz, but not vice versa), but makes our optimization problem
more difficult. We must estimate an additional set of parame-
ters embodied by Kx for all points in the space, which limits
the degree which we can accurately estimate them. This can
be particularly difficult for points in the tail of the distribution.
Further, we are not aware of a method to enforce the solution
to be locally Lipschitz. While a method was recently pro-
posed for enforcing global K-Lipschitz (Gouk et al. 2018),
it is not applicable for the reasons just discussed. Devising
such techniques is an open avenue for future work which may
further improve our ANSR technique.
4 Methodology
Following Biggio, Fumera, and Roli (2014), we will define
the threat-model by which our hypothetical adversary acts for
our evaluation. A white-box scenario will be used, where we
assume our adversary knows our model fθ(·), its weights θ,
and the training data. The adversary’s goal will be to perturb
an input xi into x˜i such that the squared error between yi and
fθ(x˜i) is maximized2. The adversary’s perturbation will be
limited to the L∞ ball of radius  = 0.1 (i.e., ‖xi − x˜i‖∞ <
), but the adversary may otherwise alter any feature as they
see fit. Implicit in most prior works is the assumption that
the defender knows the value of , and this assumption is
an integral part of the Gradient Regularization defense (Lyu,
Huang, and Liang 2015; Simon-Gabriel et al. 2018; Yu et al.
2018). For parity with prior works, we will continue with this
assumption.
2Implicit in this assumption is that the perturbation has not
meaningfully changed the true response yi. This is not absolutely
true, but since we do not know the generating function, is assumed
for simplicity.
Having defined the threat model under which we will op-
erate, we will now enumerate the data sets, attacks, hyper-
parameter optimization, and other minutia of our methodol-
ogy.
4.1 Data
Experiments were run on the following regression data sets.
Prior to use, each data set was split into training, validation,
and test sets. The independent variables for each data set were
then normalized using training set statistics. All data sets
were obtained from the UCI Machine Learning repository,
and a summary of their properties is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Size, dimensionality, and sparsity of data sets.
Data Set N D Sparsity
Boston Housing 506 13 12.82%
Communities and Crime 2215 101 3.23%
CT Slices 53 500 384 64.95%
Malware 107 856 482 88.63%
Condition Based Maintenance 11 934 16 0.40%
BostonHousing In the Boston house price data of Harrison
and Rubinfeld (1978), the target variable is the median value
in thousands of dollars of owner-occupied homes in the area
of Boston, Massachusetts.
Communities and Crime The second data set we evaluate
our approach on is the Communities and Crime Unnormal-
ized data set (Redmond and Highley 2010). The number of
murders in 1995 is the target variable, and variables include
potential factors such as percent of housing occupied, per
capita income, and police operating budget. Independent vari-
ables from the original data set that contained missing values
were dropped.
Relative Location of CT Slices on Axial Axis The third
data set we evaluate our defense on is the Relative Location
of CT Slices on Axial Axis data set (Graf et al. 2011). The
data consists of a set of 53500 CT images from 74 different
patients where each CT slice is described by two histograms
in polar space. The histograms describe the location of bone
structures in the image and the location of air inclusions
inside of the body. The independent variables consist of the
information contained in the two histograms, and the target
variable is the relative location of an image on the axial axis.
Malware The fourth data set we evaluate on is the Dy-
namic Features of VirusShare Executables data set from
Huynh, Ng, and Ariyapala (2017) which contains the dy-
namic features of executables collected by VirusShare be-
tween November 2010 and July 2014. The target variable is
a risk score between 0 and 1.
Condition Based Maintenance The Condition Based
Maintenance of Naval Propulsion Plants data set consists
of results from a numerical simulator of a naval vessel char-
acterized by a gas turbine propulsion plant (Coraddu et al.
2016). This data set has two target variables, the gas turbine’s
compressor decay state coefficient and the gas turbine’s tur-
bine decay state coefficient. As such we will treat this as two
different regression data sets that use the same feature set.
4.2 Attacks
Fast Gradient Sign Method The Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) is a L∞ bounded attack (I. J. Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S.
Bengio 2017). Given a training data point (x, y), cost func-
tion J , and model parameters θ, FGSM computes an adver-
sarial example x˜ as
x˜ = x+ sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y))
where  is a parameter controlling attack magnitude. FGSM
is included as a simple one-step attack baseline.
Projected Gradient Descent The Projected Gradient De-
scent (PGD) attack is a more powerful multi-step variant of
FGSM (Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio 2017). A Q-
step PGD attack is defined recursively as
x0 = x
xq+1 = clipx,ρ (x
q + sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)))
x˜ = xQ
where clipx,ρ(x
a) is the element-wise clipping of xa to [x−
ρ, x+ ρ]. Because PGD has been argued as an effective and
near-optimal first-order attack method (Madry et al. 2018),
we use it as our stronger baseline for an iterative attack.
Attack Settings In our experiments, we evaluate perfor-
mance against both an FGSM attack with magnitude param-
eter  = 0.1 and a 10-step PGD attack with step magnitude
parameter  = 0.025 and clipping radius ρ = 0.1. Setting
the FGSM magnitude parameter equal to the PGD clipping
radius ensures that the attack radius is the same across both
FGSM and PGD.
4.3 Baselines
Our baseline model will be one trained using the Mean
Squared Error (MSE) loss function `(a) = a2. Without any
defenses implemented, this would correspond to the normal
case when a person builds a model without any adversarial
assumptions. For each potential defense, we will compare its
MSE when under attack to the baseline, as well as its accu-
racy when no attack has occurred. Our primary comparison
point will be our new defense ANSR, but we will also include
two other baseline defenses to compare with.
One possible alternative hypothesis to our ANSR approach
is that our use of the indicator function in (5) will allow too
much variation and instability in larger areas of the search
space. That instead of penalizing numerical instability, we
will instead form some kind of approximate robust-estimator,
where the loss surface changes more significantly as the ab-
solute difference a increases (Huber 1981). Prior work has
proposed that the standard softmax loss is a potential enabler
of adversarial examples in the classification scenario and has
combined a change in classification loss with a non-negativity
constraint (Fleshman et al. 2018) to increase adversarial ro-
bustness. Since robust-estimators obtain better fits when out-
liers exist in the training distribution, it would make sense
that they could improve defenses against adversarial attacks.
By avoiding the impact of outliers, they also avoid learning
more complex functions (with more room for adversaries
to operate). As far as we are aware, our work is the first to
directly test if a simple change in loss function can reduce
adversarial attack success.
To test this hypothesis, we will train a model that replaces
the MSE loss with the Pseudo-Huber loss (6), which is a
robust-estimator.
`δ(a) = δ
2
(√
1 + (a/δ)2 − 1
)
(6)
The Pseudo-Huber loss is a smooth approximation of the
Huber loss function, where δ is a loss steepness parameter
(Barron 2017). If ANSR is nothing more than a crude approx-
imation of a robust estimator, we would expect the Pseudo-
Huber to perform better than ANSR, and that ANSR and
Pseudo-Huber would be highly correlated in their results.
As discussed in section 2, Gradient Regularization is
a common approach to improving adversarial robustness,
which has been re-invented multiple times and can be inter-
preted as penalizing the absolute condition number of the net-
work. If ANSR does work by improving numerical stability
as intended, but our hypothesis that a minimum degree of un-
penalized flexibility should exist is wrong, we would expect
to see Gradient Regularization perform better. When regular-
izing with respect to attacks measured by the L∞ norm, the
regularization of the gradient becomes (7).
`σ(a) = `(a) + σ
∥∥∥∥∂`(a)∂x
∥∥∥∥
1
(7)
We use the notation of Lyu, Huang, and Liang (2015) where σ
is a regularization strength parameter. Under the frameworks
where Gradient Regularization has been proposed, σ would
be set to the maximum perturbation distance .
Finally, we note that all three of the primary defenses
we will evaluate, our ANSR, Pseudo-Huber, and Gradient
Regularization, can be merged into a combined defense. The
primary loss can be Pseudo-Huber, combined with (7) and
(5) as regularization terms.
4.4 Hyperparameter Tuning
Hyperparameters for the defense as well as for baselines
were selected by cross-validation using randomized search
(Bergstra and Y. Bengio 2012) and mean squared error (MSE)
as an evaluation metric. For the Pseudo-Huber baseline,
loss steepness δ was uniformly sampled from the interval
[0.01, 16.0]. Normally for the Gradient Regularization de-
fense baseline, since we have defined the attack radius as 0.1,
we would set σ = 0.1. This is because the defense is derived
with σ being equal to the attack radius in the initial deriva-
tion. To make the Gradient Regularization defense an even
stronger baseline, we sample uniformly the regularization
strength σ from the interval [0.01, 16.0]. This allows Gradient
Regularization to be potentially stronger than necessary and
maximally quash adversarial attack strength. For our ANSR
defense, the radius scaling parameter β was uniformly sam-
pled from the interval [0.5, 8.0] and the stabilization strength
λ was uniformly sampled from the interval [0.1, 10.0]. The
expectation in equation (5) is estimated using 100 samples.
4.5 Network Architecture and Training
The network architectures in all experiments consist of an in-
put layer, a single hidden layer of size equal to the input layer
size, and a single node output layer. Rectified linear units
were used as hidden layer activation functions, and Adam was
used as the optimization algorithm (Kingma and Ba 2014).
For the Malware data set, the output was constrained to [0, 1]
using a sigmoid activation on the output layer.
5 Results and Discussion
We will now compare the results of our ANSR defense
against others on the specified datasets, where we will see it
has the best overall performance. Then we will investigate
properties of the attacks and defenses, and pursue alternative
hypotheses to our numerical stability theory.
5.1 Optimizing Against Adversary
We begin examining ANSR and other approaches when at-
tacked with a maximum perturbation radius of  = 0.1 under
the L∞ distance. The Mean Squared Error on the test set for
all six data sets under evaluation are shown in Table 2. Under
both the FGSM and PGD attacks, we can see that our ANSR
defense performs best on five out of six corpora. Across all
data sets we see that FGSM results have the same behavior
as those generated with PGD, with moderately lower MSE.
As such we will focus our discussion around PGD.
Table 2: The mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of
the Mean Squared Error on the test set for each data set. The
means and standard deviations were estimated by randomly
initializing and retraining each network 6 times. The right
most columns show the results for each defense (and no-
defense) under no attack, FGSM, and PGD based attacks.
Best results shown in bold for each column, with models
optimized to reduce error under PGD.
Attack Method
Data Set Defense No Attack FGSM PGD
Boston
ANSR 1.48E+01 (7.19E-01) 2.48E+01 (1.20E+00) 2.50E+01 (1.17E+00)
Pseudo-Huber 1.44E+01 (6.63E-01) 4.31E+01 (1.85E+00) 4.36E+01 (1.76E+00)
Gradient Regularization 1.32E+01 (6.19E-01) 3.69E+01 (1.91E+00) 3.73E+01 (2.00E+00)
No Defense 1.47E+01 (1.05E+00) 4.83E+01 (1.91E+00) 4.89E+01 (1.97E+00)
Crime
ANSR 2.52E+02 (3.79E+00) 2.86E+02 (4.13E+00) 2.87E+02 (4.18E+00)
Pseudo-Huber 2.95E+02 (3.68E+01) 3.53E+02 (3.75E+01) 3.54E+02 (3.75E+01)
Gradient Regularization 1.76E+03 (1.82E+02) 1.91E+03 (1.84E+02) 1.91E+03 (1.84E+02)
No Defense 1.84E+03 (1.82E+02) 2.01E+03 (1.81E+02) 2.01E+03 (1.81E+02)
CT Slices
ANSR 1.45E+02 (4.42E+01) 3.17E+02 (4.12E+01) 3.21E+02 (4.15E+01)
Pseudo-Huber 9.64E+01 (8.71E+00) 5.39E+02 (6.70E+01) 5.45E+02 (6.80E+01)
Gradient Regularization 1.02E+02 (1.59E+01) 3.71E+02 (4.23E+01) 3.76E+02 (4.22E+01)
No Defense 9.41E+01 (6.00E+00) 5.16E+02 (2.41E+01) 5.22E+02 (2.46E+01)
Malware
ANSR 6.24E-02 (4.62E-03) 2.17E-01 (2.68E-02) 2.51E-01 (4.17E-02)
Pseudo-Huber 6.62E-02 (6.57E-03) 2.55E-01 (3.69E-02) 2.87E-01 (4.29E-02)
Gradient Regularization 7.21E-02 (1.17E-02) 1.69E-01 (4.37E-02) 1.57E-01 (3.39E-02)
No Defense 6.70E-02 (7.10E-03) 2.78E-01 (4.31E-02) 3.22E-01 (5.31E-02)
CBM Comp
ANSR 3.07E-04 (6.91E-05) 1.16E-02 (2.57E-03) 1.18E-02 (2.50E-03)
Pseudo-Huber 3.51E-04 (6.54E-05) 1.42E-02 (3.04E-03) 1.44E-02 (3.01E-03)
Gradient Regularization 3.57E-04 (4.54E-05) 1.41E-02 (2.67E-03) 1.42E-02 (2.69E-03)
No Defense 3.38E-04 (2.06E-05) 1.72E-02 (4.83E-03) 1.73E-02 (4.83E-03)
CBM Turb
ANSR 1.62E-04 (1.17E-04) 1.26E-02 (4.54E-03) 1.27E-02 (4.49E-03)
Pseudo-Huber 1.26E-04 (4.13E-05) 1.53E-02 (1.84E-03) 1.54E-02 (1.82E-03)
Gradient Regularization 1.52E-04 (9.34E-05) 1.32E-02 (3.10E-03) 1.33E-02 (3.09E-03)
No Defense 1.39E-04 (8.87E-05) 1.32E-02 (2.66E-03) 1.32E-02 (2.68E-03)
These results allow us to infer conclusions regarding a
number of potential hypotheses regarding performance and
the method by which ANSR provides improved robustness
to adversarial attacks.
First, we can see that the Pseudo-Huber loss improves
the model’s resistance to adversarial attack in four out of six
datasets. This tells us that the robust regression hypothesis has
merit, and shows that we can often improve results by giving
greater deference to the choice in target loss to optimize for.
The Pseudo-Huber’s improvement was most significant on
the Crime data set, which has a target response y in the range
of [0, 1000]. This is the largest response range of our corpus,
and Pseudo-Huber produces results close to that of our ANSR
defense while also providing a 6.2× reduction to MSE when
no attack is present. In this case, ANSR also provides a better
reduction in un-attacked MSE by a factor of 7.3. This would
seem to confirm that outliers can have a significant impact on
a model’s susceptibility to adversarial examples.
Pseudo-Huber loss only produces an improvement of 1.1×
to MSE under PGD attack on the Boston data set while per-
forming worse than no defense on the CT Slices dataset,
while ANSR has more dramatic 2.0× and 1.6× improve-
ments for each respective corpus. In addition, ANSR and
Pseudo-Huber have similar performance on Crime and Mal-
ware corpora, but dissimilar performance on the Boston and
CT Slices data sets. As such, we do not believe ANSR’s ben-
efit is just an artifact of robust regression, and thus ANSR is
more than a robust regression technique.
The second alternative hypothesis was that ANSR may
be a less effective approach of penalizing numerical insta-
bility than Gradient Regularization’s minimization of the ab-
solute condition number of the model. However, we see on
the Crime data set that Gradient Regularization has 1.05×
improvement in MSE, where ANSR has a dramatically im-
proved 7.0×. Gradient Regularization is also less improved
on the Boston data set and still trails on the CT Slices data
set. These results would appear to support our prior belief
that in the regressions setting, a minimum degree of model
flexibility should be allowed without penalization.
The only case where ANSR does not provide the best MSE
under attack by PGD is on the Malware dataset. In this case,
Gradient Regularization performs best with a 2.1× reduction,
followed by ANSR at a factor 1.3 and Pseudo-Huber at 1.1.
Gradient Regularization’s success in this case is because
we have allowed it to over-regularize by choosing values of
σ >  = 0.1. In this case, cross-validation found σ = 2.9
minimized the PGD attack MSE, a value 29× greater than
what standard Gradient Regularization would have selected.
ANSR appears to be the best individual regularization
approach against adversarial attacks across the majority of
datasets. It uniformly dominates the Pseudo-Huber loss under
attack, and with one exception does the same compared to
an enhanced Gradient Regularization that is allowed to over-
select the strength of σ. Though not a design goal, ANSR
even improves non-attacked MSE on three out of six datasets,
by up to a factor of 7.3×.
Because the three defenses we are evaluating target differ-
ent aspects of the adversarial problem, we can further com-
bine them to produce a combined defense. The results are
Table 3: Results when combining all three defenses into a
single combined defense. The MSE means and standard de-
viations (in parentheses) were estimated by randomly initial-
izing and retraining each network 6 times. Results in bold
when better than than any individual defense from Table 2.
Attack
Data Set No Attack FGSM PGD
Boston 1.63E+01 (9.97E-01) 2.50E+01 (1.38E+00) 2.52E+01 (1.36E+00)
Crime 3.15E+02 (2.50E+01) 3.47E+02 (2.57E+01) 3.48E+02 (2.57E+01)
CT Slices 1.30E+02 (3.59E+01) 2.66E+02 (3.59E+01) 2.70E+02 (3.60E+01)
Malware 1.81E-01 (1.29E-01) 1.93E-01 (1.13E-01) 1.94E-01 (1.11E-01)
CBM Comp 3.21E-04 (8.16E-05) 1.21E-02 (3.46E-03) 1.22E-02 (3.51E-03)
CBM Turb 1.98E-04 (1.33E-04) 1.17E-02 (3.25E-03) 1.19E-02 (3.18E-03)
shown in Table 3, where we see the combined defense im-
proves the results on the CT Slices and CBM Turbine datasets
— while still being competitive on all other data sets. The im-
provement gives us further confidence that ANSR tackles
different aspects than just robust regression or the prior Gra-
dient Regularization approach.
5.2 Properties of Adversarial Perturbations
Now that we have shown that ANSR provides improved de-
fense against adversarial attacks on regression problems, we
seek to further elucidate properties and aspects of its effec-
tiveness. We first begin by looking at the distribution of per-
turbation magnitudes. Since we are evaluating adversarial
regression, errors are a continuous function of the output —
rather than a discrete change once one class probability sur-
passes another like the classification setting. As such, reduc-
tions in MSE could occur in multiple ways. The two general
cases are shifting the entire distribution of perturbations (i.e.,
reducing the maximum successful attack magnitude), and
right-skewing of the distribution (i.e., changing the frequency
of success types). A defense will ideally exhibit both of these
properties on a consistent basis.
The distributions of PGD magnitudes are shown in Fig-
ure 1 for each data set. In this figure we can see that when
no defense is present, the perturbation magnitude has no par-
ticular distribution. For Crime it is unimodal with mild right
skew, on Boston and Malware it is bimodal and almost sym-
metric, more erratic with left-skew in distribution on the CT
Slices corpus, and simply bimodal on the CBM data sets.
All three defenses make some improvement in shifting
the distribution of perturbation magnitude to the left (i.e.,
smaller), but not always. On Crime, Gradient Regularization
only increases the right-skew, and on Malware, Pseudo-Huber
has the same effect.
An overall trend is that the Pseudo-Huber loss and Gradi-
ent Regularization have relatively little impact on the nature
of the distribution (i.e., relatively similar shapes). By compar-
ison, ANSR changes every distribution but CBM Turbine to
be right skewed and reduces the maximum attack magnitude.
In all but the Malware corpus, this includes moving the major-
ity of the distribution to a near-zero perturbation magnitude.
ANSR is the only method to have such significant impact
on the distribution of perturbations, and we believe this is a
result of directly tackling the numerical stability hypothesis.
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Figure 1: Magnitude of PGD’s perturbation on the response
of the model when each defense is used in training. The y-
axis shows the density of the distribution, and the x-axis the
binned magnitude of the perturbation. The farther left the
distribution is, the better it has performed.
Given these results, we also wish to investigate two alter-
native hypotheses to the source of adversarial perturbations
in the regression case: a relationship between perturbation
magnitude (i.e., |yˆPGD − y|) and target response, and lower
density regions of the data. If the source was with relation to
response magnitude, we could attribute improvements to a
smoothing of the loss surface by ANSR and Gradient Reg-
ularization (Yu et al. 2018). If connected to point density,
we could attribute improvement to ANSR connecting infor-
mation between points and their density neighborhood. If
neither strongly holds, we believe this leaves the numerical
stability and optimization theory discussed in subsection 3.2
as the best explanation for ANSR’s improvement.
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Figure 2: Plots of the magnitude of the perturbation under
PGD attack (y-axis) against the true target value y (x-axis).
The first hypothesis, that as y becomes larger the relative
change in the size of the perturbation under PGD stays the
same or increases, is investigated in Figure 2. The results
provide some evidence of a consistent trend that larger y
values produce larger perturbations. This however does not
capture the whole story. On the CT Slices data set we can
see that there is some distinct property of the datums at
y ≈ 27 that causes a large spike in susceptibility to attack
across all defenses. On Malware we see ANSR and Pseudo-
Huber have both positive and negative correlation with the
response y, and on Crime we see both these methods have no
impact on the perturbation magnitude for y over two orders
of magnitude in range. Overall, based on the variety of results
we do not believe the response range y is a causative source
of successful adversarial attacks.
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Figure 3: Plots of the magnitude of the perturbation under
PGD attack (y-axis) against each point’s distance to its near-
est neighbor (x-axis).
The second hypothesis is that in highly dense regions of
the input space, the function is well modeled and leaves little
room for successful attacks, and that success lies in the lower
density regions of the space. In Figure 3 we plot the pertur-
bation magnitude as a function of nearest neighbor distance.
Across all three defensive techniques, we see no particular
relationship between the magnitude of PGD attack success
and the density of the attacked point. On the CBM data sets
we even have evidence of the opposite of the hypothesis. In
both cases the most successful adversarial attacks exist only
in the higher density points.
Given these results, the numerical stability hypothesis ap-
pears to be the best current explanation for ANSR’s success.
It is the only defense to meaningfully change the distribution
of attack successes, and our investigation of two alternative
hypotheses fails to provide contradictory evidence.
6 Conclusion
In this work we have introduced ANSR, a new regulariza-
tion approach to combat adversarial attacks for regression
applications that out-performs other approaches. It is inspired
by encouraging numerical stability with theoretical connec-
tions to locally Lipschitz continuity. Alternative hypotheses
to ANSR’s success did not displace our numerical stability
theory.
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